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Abstract — Modern wireless nodes in building 
automation systems interconnect natively through 
the Internet Protocol (IP). As a result, the emerging 
coalescence of existing IT networks with networks on 
the field level presents many challenges. Specifically, 
mutual authentication of devices in an IT 
environment is one of the main issues. Moreover, this 
mutual authentication has to take place with 
embedded devices in the field that feature manifold 
constraints and require a simple but secure 
provisioning. The Fairhair Alliance is in the process 
of standardizing an autonomic secure bootstrapping 
process to tackle these challenges.  The paper outlines 
this automated approach and shows the successful 
implementation of a real-life prototype. This 
demonstrates that the required cryptographic 
functions and procedures are feasible on a 
constrained low power device. 
Keywords —IoT security, authentication, automated 
network enrollment, wireless building automation, low 
power wireless sensors, resource constrained systems 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent technologies and standards allow connecting 
constrained wireless nodes to the Internet by natively 
using the prevailing Internet Protocol (IP). Such 
standards include the protocol stack as defined by the 
Thread Group [1], based on CoAP, UDP, IPv6, 
6LoWPAN and IEEE 802.15.4. As a result, the sensor 
and actuator networks on the field level will coalesced 
with the existing IT networks. Specifically, replacing 
gateways with routers significantly simplifies a building 
automation system and enables new applications. 
Employing IP communication, a central automation 
station can directly and uniformly access sensor and 
actuator services on field nodes. 
Consequently, to become a full-fledged member of an 
IT domain, a constrained node on the field level has to 
fulfill specific security requirements. However, 
implementing such requirements is especially 
challenging on constrained low power and low cost 
nodes. Such nodes typically have decidedly lower 
resources with regard to compute performance, memory 
and network connectivity. Nevertheless, such nodes 
require a mutual authentication during the provisioning 
into an individual IT domain. Specifically, several trust 
relationships need to be established. 
Before granting access to the node, the IT domain 
administrator requires proof that the node is not 
compromised, e.g. by loading malicious firmware. This 
proof includes not only the proof that the trusted supplier 
has manufactured the node but also a complete and 
unforgeable list of previous installations and owners. As 
building automation systems typically are an integral part 
of a building, they represent capital assets and change 
ownership during their lifetime. On the other hand, 
before legitimately joining a new domain, the individual 
node needs to know: Is the deployment into this specific 
building legit? The scale of building automation systems 
in large buildings with hundreds of nodes mandates a 
highly automated authentication process. A simple 
provisioning of the nodes is essential. 
Funded by Innosuisse - Swiss Innovation Agency under project number 
19328.1 PFES-ES. 
Wireless Congress: Systems & Applications, 14.-15. November 2018, München 2 
 
The paper presents results from a two-year long, 
federally funded (Innosuisse) project. As a proof-of-
concept, the project implements a demonstrator based on 
the emerging recommendations of the Fairhair Alliance 
[2]. Low power nodes in a Thread network shall be 
provided with a secure bootstrapping process to be easily 
provisioned into an existing IT domain. The use of 
smartphones supports and simplifies this provisioning 
process. The public-key-based mutual authentication 
takes place between the low power nodes on one side and 
a Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) 
operated by the node manufacturer and a so-called 
Registrar operated by the building operator on the other 
side. As a result, the node receives an Operational Device 
Certificate and can legitimately join the IT domain. The 
paper illustrates the challenges encountered and proposes 
appropriate approaches 
This paper is structured accordingly. We begin by 
describing the application environment. This includes a 
brief overview of the Thread protocol stack as well as a 
description of the challenge to establish trust between a 
Leaf Node and a building operator. We continue by 
outlining the proposed approach that we have 
implemented to establish such trust. We call this 
enrollment approach Autonomic Secure Bootstrapping. 
In the fourth section, we present the implementation of 
our Leaf Node followed by an overview of the test set-up 
in section five. We end with appropriate conclusions. 
II. APPLICATION ENVIRONMENT 
The following section uses an exemplary system from 
a building automation environment to illustrate the 
challenges. However, the described procedures and 
protocols can be readily adapted to other system 
environments. 
A. Building Automation System Environment 
Fig. 1 shows a system setup as typically found in a 
building automation environment.   A Thread mesh 
network facilitates end-to-end IPv6 connectivity. The 
depicted network handles both, local communication 
between low power field nodes as well as IP based 
connectivity to upper data processing entities such as 
automation stations or cloud services. With regard to the 
building under control, these data processing entities can 
be located on premise or off premise. 
 
Fig. 1. Example of a building automation system based on a Thread 
mesh network 
The displayed Thread network features nodes with 
distinct roles. Typically, there are Thread Routers, which 
are always on and route traffic among the devices. The 
routers form the mesh topology. One of the routers 
becomes the Thread Leader, which manages network 
parameters and coordinates the commissioning. In 
contrast to routers, there are Leaf Nodes. These are 
sleepy end devices specifically designed for low power 
operation. Such Leaf Nodes are often characterized by 
long sleep phases, resulting in high access latencies. As 
an example, a Leaf Node may periodically wake up from 
its sleep phase, take a measurement on its sensor and 
upload the result through the network to a data 
processing entity. To do so, it will make use of a Border 
Router, which interconnects the low power Thread 
network with a backbone network based on Wi-Fi or 
Ethernet. Remarkably, the Border Router does not 
employ a protocol translation like in a typical gateway 
device, but rather forwards the IPv6 packets natively. As 
a result, the Thread network behaves as a transparent 
IPv6 extension to the upper network. 
B. Protocol stack 
The Thread Group fosters and promotes an 
interoperable protocol stack based on different existing 
standards. Fig. 2 depicts a protocol stack on a Leaf Node 
in a Thread network. 
 
Fig. 2. Thread protocol stack on Leaf Node 
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Starting with the physical and data link layer, the 
stack is based on an IEEE 802.15.4 radio operating in the 
2.4 GHz frequency band. The 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over 
Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks) adaption 
layer of IETF enables the use of IPv6 protocol and its 
powerful routing mechanisms on constrained devices. 
Above that, the connectionless UDP (User Datagram 
Protocol) forms the transport layer as it requires much 
less processor resources than the connection-oriented 
TCP (Transport Control Protocol). Meanwhile on the 
application layer, MLE (Mesh Link Establishment) 
configures and organizes the wireless mesh. DTLS 
(Datagram Transport Layer Security) provides end-to-
end security in preventing eavesdropping, tampering, or 
message forgery. On top of DTLS, the RESTful web 
transfer protocol CoAPs (Secure Constrained Application 
Protocol) facilitates access to resources under URLs 
(Uniform Resource Locators). Specifically, such data 
transfers may include accesses among nodes within the 
Thread network itself as well as accesses between Thread 
network nodes and hosts outside of the Thread network. 
Particularly, the latter can e.g. be an automation station or 
a cloud service entity on the global internet. 
At the top of the stack, the Leaf Node supports one or 
more application layer protocols to ensure semantic 
interoperability between devices. Possible specifications 
to organize the resources on a Leaf Node in a uniform 
way include KNX [3], BACnet [4] and Zigbee DotDot 
[5]. 
C. Establishing Trust: From Supply Chain to System 
Integration 
A typical Leaf Node of a building automation system 
passes through many hands and many organizations 
before it is successfully and securely integrated into the 
IT network of a building operator. Fig. 3 shows the route 
of such a Leaf Node starting from its manufacturing site 
all the way to an accomplished system integration. 
Generally, a manufacturer mass-produces such Leaf 
Nodes without any customization or configuration for the 
customer site where the Leaf Node will be installed. 
Actually, in most cases the customer and the customer 
site are unknown at the time of production. Instead, the 
Leaf Node travels through a long supply chain with 
multiple organizations before it is installed at a building 
site. Frequently, contractors or personnel with a low 
trustfulness carry out the installation of the Leaf Node. 
As a result, the Leaf Node is exposed to many 
opportunities for malicious manipulations. Such potential 
manipulations include unauthorized replication, 
compromised firmware updates and deceiving reuse of 
device identities. 
 
Fig. 3. The route of a Leaf Node (device) for a building automation 
system: From manufacturing site all the way to system integration 
In a conventional process, eventually, an IT-Integrator 
or network administrator will have to enroll the installed 
Leaf Node manually into the specific IT environment of 
the building. Specifically, the IT-Integrator will have to 
decide, whether he trusts this particular Leaf Node. 
Accordingly, he will request solid proof that the Leaf 
Node is genuine, that it comes from a trusted 
manufacturer and so far has only been enrolled in 
environments by trustworthy previous owners. To be 
more specific, the IT-Integrator will manually enroll the 
Leaf Node into a domain. Likewise, this enrollment 
requires, that the Leaf Node trusts the IT-Integrator. A 
domain can be an IT environment or an application area 
like e.g. a heating system. In this context, a domain is a 
set of entities that share a common, organization-specific 
trust anchor. This trust anchor, under the responsibility of 
the network administrator, acts as a Domain Certification 
Authority (Domain CA). 
However, as the number of nodes in building 
automation networks is growing rapidly, there is a strong 
need for an automatic enrollment process. Particularly, 
even untrustworthy personnel shall be able to trigger such 
an automatic enrollment. Still, the authentication and 
enrollment shall be secure and reliable. The following 
sections will describe such an approach. One key aspect 
is the reinforcement of the trust relationship between the 
manufacturer and the operator of the Leaf Node. 
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III. AUTONOMIC SECURE BOOTSTRAPPING 
The following section outlines the key concepts for an 
automated enrollment in a building automation system. 
The described concepts are part of the emerging 
recommendations of the Fairhair Alliance, which again 
adopt concepts from IETF ANIMA working group [6]. 
Namely, these are described as “Bootstrapping Remote 
Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)” [7] and “Enrollment 
over secure Transport (EST)” [8]. 
In the following, the term public-key certificate shall 
mean an electronic document used to prove the 
ownership of a public key. It includes information on the 
identity of the holder (e.g. the serial number) and is 
digitally signed by a Certificate Authority (CA). The 
public-key certificates are formatted according to X.509 
[9] and [10]. In some cases, the text uses specific names, 
like e.g. Operational Device Certificate, for public-key 
certificates to indicate their context more precisely. 
A. The Role of the Registrar 
The proposed approach introduces a new entity, the 
Registrar. The objective is to replace the individual IT-
Integrator (the person) with a fully automated service 
entity. The Registrar represents the individual domain of 
a building site and acts as a registration authority. 
Consequently, the Registrar decides whether a Leaf Node 
is allowed to join the domain. In case of a positive 
decision, the Registrar will forward an Operational 
Device Certificate issued by the Domain Certification 
Authority (Domain CA). The Operational Device 
Certificate is digitally signed by the Domain CA. It 
certifies the identity and ownership of the included public 
key. As a result, other members of the domain can use 
this public key to authenticate the Leaf Node as a legit 
member of the domain and to authorize access to services 
appropriately, i.e. for authorization of application‐to 
application communication. 
B. Initial Trust Relationships 
As a prerequisite for the autonomic on-site enrollment 
process, two essential trust relationships have to be 
established prior to the start of the enrollment. Both, the 
individual new Leaf Node as well as the Registrar have to 
trust the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority 
(MASA). In this context, trust means that both instances 
can unequivocally authenticate the MASA and believe 
that the statements of the MASA are true. However, the 
new Leaf Node and the Registrar do not have any trust 
relationship with each other yet. Such trust will be 
established during the enrollment process. Fig. 4 
illustrates these initial trust relationships.  
To establish the trust of the Registrar in the MASA, 
many approaches are possible. For example, an IT-
Administrator could configure this manually at a single 
point in time based on his trust in the manufacturer. 
Interestingly, for the described process the MASA does 
not have to trust the Registrar. Although the MASA may 
be able to authenticate the Registrar, it does not have to 
believe that statements issued by the Registrar are true. 
 
Fig. 4. Initial trust relationships before start of autonomic secure 
bootstrapping 
Typically, the trust relationship of the Leaf Node to 
the MASA is imprinted at the manufacturing site. During 
the manufacturing process an Initial Device Identifier 
(IDevID, [11]) is created for each individual Leaf Node 
device. The IDevID is a device identifier that is 
cryptographically bound to the device and is securely 
stored inside the Leaf Node. Specifically, the IDevID 
includes a Manufacturer Device Certificate that contains 
an individual device serial number for the Leaf Node. 
Furthermore, the IDevID contains the manufacturer CA’s 
public-key certificate, identifying the manufacturer CA 
as the root of trust.  
C. Procedure Overview 
Fig. 5 depicts the system components and their 
connections with regard to the Autonomic Secure 
Bootstrapping procedure. The figure extends the 
previously introduced example of a building automation 
system. 
The process starts with the commissioning of the Leaf 
Node into the Thread network. The Leaf Node joins the 
on-site Thread network and gains IPv6 access. However, 
the Leaf Node does not have access to any applications 
yet as it yet lacks an operational identity. The Thread 
commissioning involves a straightforward application of 
the procedures described in [12]. Therefore, it will not be 
further detailed here. 




Fig. 5. System overview for on-site enrollment procedure 
Once the Leaf Node has gained IPv6 access, the 
presented approach includes three steps to enroll a 
factory-new Leaf Node into a specific IT-environment of 
a building site. 
1. Establishing mutual trust between Leaf Node and 
Registrar  
In this step, the Leaf Node and the Registrar 
mutually authenticate each other. Both trust the 
MASA. Therefore, the MASA facilitates the mutual 
authentication process with a Voucher [13]. After 
completion of this step, the Leaf Node has securely 
stored the Domain CA Certificate of the Registrar 
for future authentications. I.e., the Registrar has 
imprinted the factory-new Leaf Node with the 
appropriate key material of the domain. With the 
mutual trust in place, the Registrar can now 
optionally configure further trust relationships on the 
Leaf Node, e.g. the trust relationships to other trust 
anchors. 
2. Enrollment over secure transport (EST)   
The Leaf Node wants to enroll itself into the domain. 
Therefore, the Leaf Node generates a new 
private/public key pair for which it requests an 
Operational Device Certificate from the Registrar, 
i.e. a public-key certificate issued by the Domain 
CA. The Operational Device Certificate is part of a 
locally significant secure device identifier (LDevID) 
[11]. It certifies the ownership of the private/public 
key pair and represents the identity of the Leaf 
Node. Therefore, at the end of this step the 
operational identity of the Leaf Node has been 
provisioned. 
3. Operational network enrollment  
The Leaf Node uses the new Operational Device 
Certificate to authenticate itself within the domain. 
Based on this authentication, providers of 
application level services may grant the Leaf Node 
access to their services. In the chosen example, the 
Leaf Node can send data to the data processing 
entities, i.e. either the automation station or the 
cloud services. 
The following sections describe these three individual 
steps in detail. 
D. Establishing mutual trust between Leaf Node and 
Registrar 
The factory-new Leaf Node discovers a Registrar and 
provisionally trusts it. There are many possible ways, 
how this discovery can take place. For example, it could 
be a pre-configured service record in DNS or a lookup in 
a resource directory using CoAPs. 
By going through the Registrar, the Leaf Node 
requests the MASA to issue a Voucher. The Registrar 
relays this Voucher to the Leaf Node. Fig. 6 shows this 
sequence. 
  
Fig. 6. Obtaining a Voucher from the MASA 
The Leaf Node (via the Border router) initiates a 
DTLS handshake with the Registrar. After successful 
completion of the handshake, the Registrar and the Leaf 
Node provisionally trust each other and can communicate 
with each other through a secure channel. In the process 
of the DTLS handshake, the Leaf Node provides its 
Manufacturer Device Certificate to the Registrar. 
Optionally, the Registrar may choose to verify this 
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public-key certificate with a CA certificate obtained from 
the manufacturer. Similarly, the Registrar provides its 
Device Certificate to the Leaf Node. However, the Leaf 
Node cannot validate the Registrar yet. Therefore, the 
Leaf Node stores the Device Certificate of the Registrar 
for later verification. 
In the next step, the Leaf Node submits a Voucher 
Request to the Registrar. It does so, through a CoAPs 
POST to a defined resource on the Registrar. The 
Voucher Request is a JSON-encoded object and contains 
 A nonce, i.e. a newly created random number. At 
the reception of a Voucher, the nonce will allow to 
test for its “freshness”. 
 A serial number as a string. The serial number 
serves as a unique identification of the Leaf Node. 
 The Device Certificate of the Registrar (signed by 
the Domain CA). 
The Voucher Request is digitally signed and 
structured as a SignedData type of the Cryptographic 
Message Syntax (CMS) [14]1. The signature ensures the 
integrity of the request. In addition, it identifies the 
specific Leaf Node as the issuer of the Voucher Request, 
i.e., as a legit product of a particular manufacturer. 
In a further step, the Registrar forwards the Voucher 
Request to the MASA using a secured connection. For 
this purpose, the Registrar encapsulates the Voucher 
Request of the Leaf Node within a Registrar Voucher 
Request [7]. The Registrar duly signs the Registrar 
Voucher Request. 
On reception of the Voucher Request, the MASA 
verifies that the request originates from a genuine Leaf 
Node of the manufacturer. This is achieved through 
verification of the CMS signature. At the minimum, the 
MASA logs the provisioning of the Leaf Node in an 
unforgeable device history, which is specific for the 
individual Leaf Node. Furthermore, it compares the 
Registrar identity included in the Voucher Request of the 
Leaf Node with the identity that the Registrar used to 
sign its Registrar Voucher Request to the MASA. The 
MASA confirms that it has indeed received the Voucher 
Request from the same Registrar that the Leaf Node has 
provisionally trusted. Therefore, even if this Registrar is 
not legit, the identity of this Registrar is now permanently 
logged in the device history of the Leaf Node. If at a later 
time a legit Registrar wants to enroll the same Leaf Node, 
it will see from the provided device history that this 
specific Leaf Node has been enrolled by an illicit 
Registrar. As a result, the legit Registrar may deny 
enrollment of the Leaf Node. Notably, the MASA does 
not take that decision, but through the device history, it 
transparently provides the information to a potential 
                                                          
1 similar to the SignedData type in PKCS#7 [24] 
Registrar. At the end, it is always at the discretion of the 
Registrar, whether it wants to trust the Leaf Node or not. 
Optionally, the MASA can apply further criteria 
before accepting the Voucher Request. E.g., that the 
Registrar indeed belongs to a domain in which the Leaf 
Node can be legitimately used. Eventually, the MASA 
issues a Voucher and sends it to the Registrar. In addition 
to the Voucher, it provides the Registrar with the device 
history of the Leaf Node. The issued Voucher is a CMS 
SignedData structure, signed with the MASA’s private 
key. Particularly the Voucher contains the following 
objects: 
 Nonce that matches the nonce in the Voucher 
Request. 
 Assertion: A statement from the MASA whether it 
has verified the identity of the Registrar or 
alternatively has just logged it as the owner 
without verification. 
 Domain CA Certificate (as provided by the 
Registrar in its Voucher Request) 
 Serial number of the Leaf Node for which the 
Voucher has been created. 
Using the Voucher and the device history, the 
Registrar can take a decision to trust the Leaf Node 
permanently. In addition, it may use a mixture of 
blacklists and whitelists for this decision. In case of a 
positive decision, the Registrar forwards the Voucher to 
the Leaf Node. 
Eventually, the Leaf Node verifies, that the Voucher 
has been signed by the MASA. It does so with the use of 
the preinstalled MASA CA public-key certificate. 
Furthermore, it verifies the nonce and the serial number 
in the received Voucher. Additionally, it verifies the 
previously stored Device Certificate of the Registrar. It 
does so with the Domain CA Certificate that it received 
in the Voucher. In case all these verifications are 
successful, the Leaf Node accepts the Registrar and 
henceforth has permanent trust relationship with the 
Registrar. Importantly, the Leaf Node now holds the 
Domain CA public-key certificate. I.e., the Leaf Node 
has adopted the Registrar (on behalf of the Domain CA) 
as trustworthy. Among other things, the Leaf Node can 
use the public key from the Domain CA Certificate to 
verify that Operational Device Certificates presented by 
other devices in the domain have been duly signed by the 
Domain CA. 
E. Enrollment over secure transport (EST) 
Now that the Leaf Node and the Registrar have 
established mutual trust, the Leaf Node enrolls itself to 
the Domain. For this purpose, the Leaf Node has to 
obtain its individual Operational Device Certificate. 
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To begin with, the Leaf Node generates a new key 
pair, consisting of a public and a private key. Based on 
this key pair, the Leaf Node then generates a Certificate 
Signing Request (CSR) in PKCS#10 syntax [15]. The 
Leaf Node then sends the CSR to the Registrar, which 
provides an Operational Device Certificate from the 
Domain CA. The Registrar communicates the newly 
generated public-key certificate to the Leaf Node in a 
CSR response. Fig. 7 illustrates this process according to 
EST-coaps [16]. 
 
Fig. 7. Enrollment over secure CoAP (EST-coaps) 
The Leaf Node uses a CoAPs request to send the CSR 
to a defined resource on the CoAPs server of the 
Registrar. The data serialization format of the CSR as 
well as of the CSR Response is Concise Binary Object 
Representation (CBOR) [17]. The CSR Response 
includes a public-key certificate (the Operational Device 
Certificate of the Leaf Node). At the completion of this 
step, the Leaf Node holds its individual Operational 
Device Certificate. It uses this to identify itself towards 
other devices in the domain. 
F. Operational network enrollment 
The Leaf Node can now finally authenticate itself on 
the application level.  
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF LEAF NODE 
This chapter briefly summarizes the hardware and 
firmware of the Leaf Node. Furthermore, it introduces the 
concept of secure elements. 
A. Hardware 
The hardware design includes a Nordic nRF52840 
System-on-Chip with 2.4 GHz PCB antenna. 
Furthermore, the design features the following sensors:  
 InvenSense ICS 41350 microphone 
 Bosch BME680 temperature, humidity, pressure 
and gas sensor 
 Texas Instruments OPT3001 light sensor 
 STMicroelectronics LSM6DSL accelerometer and 
gyroscope 
Fig. 8 shows the printed circuit board of the Leaf 
Node. Once as a miniaturized break-out board on the left 
and once as a larger board with more connectors and 
extension opportunities on the right. 
 
Fig. 8. Hardware implementation of Leaf Node 
The Leaf Node achieves a calculated battery lifetime 
of 10 years on two AA battery cells. The figure is 
extrapolated from detailed power measurements and is 
based on a realistic choice of configuration parameters. 
B. Firmware 
The firmware is based on OpenThread (2018-09-26) 
[18], i.e. an open source implementation of the Thread 
protocol. This incorporates the driver for the Nordic SoC 
as well as the open source package mbedTLS [19] for the 
cryptographic applications. A dedicated own application 
layer implements the autonomic secure bootstrapping 
process introduced in this paper. Our application uses the 
cryptographic operations of mbedTLS. However, in this 
case we have a security threat, as the private keys are 
stored in debuggable memory. For this reason, the 
cryptographic operations can be transferred to an external 
device called a secure element. 
C. Secure Elements 
Secure elements provide hardware accelerated support 
for cryptographic operations and tamper proof memory 
for the secure storage of cryptographically sensitive 
material. Moreover, they employ specific techniques 
against so-called side channel attacks. Secure elements 
physically isolate private keys and other secret 
cryptographic material from the application. Therefore, 
they significantly reduce the exposure to cyber security 
attacks. Typically, they use an I2C interface to 
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communicate with the host microcontroller. Private keys 
can be generated inside the protected environment of the 
secure element and never have to leave the secure 
element. The secure element takes care of all 
cryptographic operations involving private keys. 
Furthermore, secure elements can store public-key 
certificates as a root of trust, ensuring that this root of 
trust can only be changed by authorized parties. 
The Leaf Node features secure elements from four 
different vendors. Namely, these are Microchip, NXP, 
Infineon and Trusted Objects. With all of them, we have 
made extensive power as well as speed measurements. 
However, the development effort and expertise required 
to integrate the individual secure elements turned out to 
be extremely high. If secure elements are to be widely 
adopted and deployed in IoT devices, a major 
harmonization of the interfaces is required. 
V. VERIFICATION 
This section briefly describes the verification of the 
Leaf Node. Clearly, the focus of the verification is on 
showing that the described Leaf Node with its 
constrained resources can successfully perform all the 
required actions for the Autonomic Secure 
Bootstrapping. However, the detailed test sequences and 
the achieved results are outside the scope of this paper. 
A. Test Set-up 
Fig. 9 gives an overview of the test set-up. As the 
Leaf Node is the Device Under Test (DUT), only a 
limited set of functionalities has been implemented for 
the entities Registrar, Data Processing and MASA.  
 
Fig. 9. Test set-up 
At power-up, the Leaf Node initiates the Autonomic 
Secure Bootstrapping process. It establishes mutual trust 
with the Registrar, enrolls itself in the domain and finally 
authenticates itself to the Data Processing entity and 
pushes data to it. 
In addition to the test described here, further 
integration and system testing have been performed. 
These tests use a fully functional implementation of a 
Registrar in the cloud that is currently participating in 
plug-fest tests for EST-coaps interoperability. 
B. Border Router 
The Border Router consists of a Raspberry Pi Version 
3b with an nRF52840 dongle [20] connected on the USB 
port. The dongle runs OpenThread in Network Co-
Processor (NCP) mode [21]. Likewise, the Raspberry 
runs the OpenThread Border Router software [22]. As a 
result, the Border Router routes IPv6 traffic between the 
wireless Thread network devices on the local network 
and the external IP network connected through wired 
Ethernet. 
C. Registrar, Data Processing and MASA 
The applications on these instances use Californium 
[23], a framework for CoAP targeted at back-end 
services. As part of Californium, Scandium is used for 
DTLS. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents the key concepts of an Autonomic 
Secure Bootstrapping process for resource-constrained 
devices in building automation applications. The 
described security concepts are based on the emerging 
standards of the Fairhair Alliance. Manual enrollment of 
IPv6 accessible field devices is replaced with a fully 
autonomic and automated enrollment process. The entire 
process has been successfully implemented and tested on 
our own Leaf Nodes in a Thread network. Specifically, 
the project team gained hands-on experience with secure 
elements of four different Silicon vendors. Although it is 
possible to implement the described process with 
commercially available secure elements, the required 
development effort and expertise to integrate such secure 
elements turned out to be prohibitively high. The authors 
see a strong need to harmonize the use of secure 
elements. Especially on the firmware side, integration of 
secure elements has to be made tremendously simpler. 
This will be a mandatory prerequisite to ensure security 
in low power IoT nodes and therefore to enable their roll-
out in huge numbers.  
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